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ABSTRACT 
 This study examines the association between bank financial reporting opacity, 
measured by delayed expected loss recognition, and banks’ uninsured deposit financing.  
In particular, following calls from prior research, I investigate the effects of reporting 
opacity on this critical source of bank financing, which represents over $5 trillion at 
2019.  Using quarterly regulatory filings of federally-insured US commercial banks, I 
confirm a predicted negative association between uninsured deposits and larger delays in 
expected loss recognition, my proxy for reporting opacity.  I also document expected 
cross-sectional variation, with this negative association accentuated for banks that are not 
too-big-to-fail (as these lack the implicit government guarantees of too-big-to-fail banks), 
and some evidence for banks that are not publicly-traded (which have lower overall 
reporting and disclosure quality relative to publicly-traded banks).  My findings 
contribute to the extant literature on bank opacity, uninsured deposit financing, and the 
consequences of loan loss provisioning by suggesting that delayed expected loss 
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1.   INTRODUCTION 
 This study examines whether bank financial reporting opacity, as measured by 
delayed expected loss recognition, is associated with banks’ uninsured deposit financing.  
Specifically, I exploit cross-sectional differences in the application of the incurred loss 
model to examine whether delays in expected loss recognition affect banks’ uninsured 
deposit financing levels.  
 Deposits are the largest source of capital to banks, accounting for over 70% of 
bank total assets at 2019.  Deposits can be decomposed into insured versus uninsured 
deposits.  The US Federal government provides insurance through the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), which protects depositors of insured US banks against the 
loss of their deposits up to a standard maximum if an insured bank fails.  Any amount in 
excess of this threshold is uninsured.  At 2019, out of total US domestic deposits of $13.2 
trillion, $5.4 trillion or 41% are designated as uninsured (with $7.8 trillion or 59% 
insured by the FDIC).  Of note, the ratio of uninsured to total deposits has increased over 
time, from 26% in 1999 to 41% in 2019.  Despite the economic significance of this 
source of bank financing, the relation between bank financial reporting opacity and 
uninsured deposit financing is not clear, and little is known about how bank accounting 
information addresses bank creditors’ information problems (Beatty and Liao 2014).  
Most prior research focuses on the perspectives of outside equity investors rather than 
creditors.  While more recent studies have begun to investigate public debt market 
implications, we understand very little about a particular type of creditors – critical yet 
unexplored capital providers – uninsured depositors.  While uninsured depositors may 
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provide more financing to opaque banks due to their demand for safe securities (whose 
value does not fluctuate with the underlying assets) that help them share liquidity risks 
and create medium of exchange without fear of adverse selection (Diamond and Dybvig 
1983; Gorton and Pennacchi 1990; Goldstein and Pauzner 2005), such opacity could 
worsen the information asymmetry between depositors and banks managers about the 
bank’s monitoring quality and performance, leading to less uninsured deposit financing 
(Diamond 1984; Calomiris and Kahn 1991; Diamond and Rajan 2001).  Understanding 
how and why financial reporting opacity is associated with uninsured deposit financing is 
important because of the significant role of uninsured deposits in bank financing.   
 To study the relation between bank financial reporting opacity and uninsured 
deposit financing, I examine all U.S. commercial banks in 1994–2013.  I choose the 
setting of uninsured deposits of US commercial banks for several reasons.  First, 
uninsured deposits represent an economically significant, and growing, part in bank’s 
funding.  Second, relative to insured depositors, uninsured depositors face strong 
incentives to monitor bank activities, as their deposit amounts exceed those covered 
under explicit government insurance limits.  Further, uninsured depositors represent the 
wealthiest individuals and/or businesses, suggesting relatively greater resources than 
typical depositors to directly or indirectly engage in bank monitoring.    
To measure bank financial reporting opacity, I exploit variation in the timeliness 
of loan loss provisioning across banks.  Loan loss provisioning represents the most 
important and discretionary accounting choice for banks, as it affects earnings and capital 
ratios, which banks’ investors, creditors, and regulators use as signals of bank health 
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(Ryan 2011; Beatty and Liao 2014; Bushman and Williams 2012).  Following prior 
research, I define and measure the timeliness of loan loss provisioning by the extent to 
which a bank delays recognizing current and future loan portfolio deteriorations when 
determining its loan loss provision in current period: this is referred to as delayed 
expected loan loss recognition, or DELR (Bushman and Williams 2012, 2015).  Banks 
that are slower to incorporate loan deteriorations into the provision will exhibit financial 
statement indicators (such as earnings and capital) that are less timely signals of bank 
problems, creating uncertainty about the banks’ fundamentals (Bushman and Williams 
2015).  Prior research suggests that DELR is a powerful measure of financial reporting 
opacity that can impair monitoring by bank stakeholders (Bushman and Williams 2012, 
2015; Chen et al. 2020).  
Financial reporting opacity, as measured by DELR, could be associated with 
uninsured deposit financing in several ways.  Uninsured depositors could provide more 
financing to banks that appear slow to recognize expected loan loss, due to their demand 
for safe securities, leading to a positive association between financial reporting opacity 
and uninsured deposit financing.  This perspective is consistent with the liability-based 
theories that emphasize depositors’ demand for money-like safe and liquid assets and 
banks can meet this demand precisely because they are able to keep information about 
their assets hidden (Dang et al. 2017). 
Alternatively, financial reporting opacity could lead to lesser uninsured deposit 
financing, due to the increased information asymmetry and agency cost between banks 
and depositors, leading to a negative association between financial reporting opacity and 
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uninsured deposit financing.  This perspective is consistent with the asset-based and 
information asymmetry theories that highlight the value generated by banks on the asset 
side of their balance sheet.  Under these theories, banks generate value by monitoring 
borrowers, addressing the information problems between depositors and borrowers, but 
are subject to agency problems in relation with their external creditors (Armstrong et al. 
2010; Beatty and Liao 2014).  Transparency makes it easy for the creditors to see what 
banks are doing and so facilitates the creditors’ monitoring of banks.  This perspective 
suggests that opaque provisioning inhibits uninsured depositor monitoring.  To illustrate 
the idea, consider two banks with the same underlying fundamentals (e.g., prior capital 
and earnings) and that experience the same deteriorations in current and future loan 
portfolio quality, but that incorporate them into the current period’s loan loss provision 
differently (i.e., different DELR).  The bank with lower DELR is more timely: it 
recognizes the impact of these deteriorations in the current provision to a greater extent, 
and so they affect the current period’s earnings and capital ratios.  In contrast, the bank 
with higher DELR is less timely: it defers recognizing a larger portion of these loan 
deteriorations until a future period, and thus the deteriorations impact the bank’s current 
earnings and capital to a lesser extent.  Therefore, when DELR is higher, bank financial 
metrics will reflect deteriorations in the bank’s condition with more delay, increasing 
uncertainty over bank fundamentals (Bushman and Williams 2015).  Consequently, I 
predict that uninsured depositors are less likely to become aware of bank problems or 
more uncertain about bank performance and asset quality, and therefore less likely to 
provide financing, when DELR is greater.   
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Measuring uninsured deposit financing using both the level of uninsured deposit 
(using the natural log), and the ratio of uninsured deposits to total assets, I document a 
strong negative association between financial reporting opacity and uninsured deposit 
financing.  I conduct several tests to corroborate the negative association and to mitigate 
specific sources of endogeneity in DELR.  For example, I account for variation in 
banking regulations, effective federal funds rate and economic conditions via the 
inclusion of time fixed effect.  Additionally, to address concerns about bank-level 
correlated omitted variables, I show that my findings are robust to including an extensive 
set of control variables.  Furthermore, I find similar results when employing several 
alternative DELR and dependent variable measures. 
 I also examine whether the association between financial reporting opacity and 
uninsured deposit financing varies in the cross-section.  I predict and find that the 
negative association between DELR and uninsured deposits is stronger in banks that are 
not perceived as too big to fail (i.e., those banks having no implied government insurance 
guarantee).  I also find some support of a more negative association for banks that are 
private versus publicly-traded, consistent with the former having higher overall 
information asymmetry and lower information quality.  Overall, these results are 
consistent with uninsured depositors responding more to bank financial reporting opacity 
in the subset of banks for which the benefits to those depositors are most likely to 
accrue.1   
 
1  I also perform two additional analyses.  First, consistent with expectations from prior research 
(Beatty and Liao 2014), I find evidence that during recessionary periods (as defined by NBER), 




 My findings are subject to several important caveats.  First, DELR is not 
randomly distributed across banks.  While I employ several approaches to mitigate 
concerns about specific sources of endogeneity, I cannot account for all potential sources.  
It should also be noted that my analysis aims to evaluate the link between bank financial 
reporting opacity and various uninsured deposit financing outcomes in equilibrium.  I do 
not rely on a shock to transparency.  A couple of recent papers looked at such shocks 
using changes in regulatory disclosure regimes either during the national banking era 
(Granja 2018) or outside of the U.S. (Ertan et al. 2017) to address different questions.  I 
do not think such clear changes in regulatory regimes for a broad base of banks are 
available for the last few decades in the U.S., which is where the sample for my analysis 
on uninsured deposits comes from.  More importantly, I think that the ability to find 
shocks to transparency or timeliness in the data is more generally limited, since it is not at 
all clear that regimes requiring more disclosure necessarily result in more timely 
disclosure that uninsured depositors would respond to.  Hence, in my approach, I just let 
the data speak to whether uninsured depositors respond to the reporting opacity (DELR in 
my case), which I measure using the timeliness of loan loss provisioning.  The relations I 
uncover in the data between bank financial reporting opacity and uninsured deposit 
financing are quite informative for regulators, academics, and bank managers, even 
without insisting on a causal interpretation.  By providing the first direct evidence on the 
association between timeliness loan loss provisioning and uninsured deposit financing, 
 
recessionary periods.  Second, I confirm that the negative DELR-uninsured deposits association 
occurs among the bottom three quartiles of bank size, but not within the top quartile, consistent 
with depositors perceiving bank size as a counter risk indicator.   
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my study offers a starting point for exploring how financial reporting affects uninsured 
depositor monitoring.   
 Another important point is that I take the level loan loss provision to construct the 
timeliness in loan loss recognition measure as given and do not examine what economic 
forces determine equilibrium differences in DELR measure across banks.  Usual bank 
characteristics do not go very far in explaining the observed differences in opacity.  My 
approach has little bearing on the interpretation of analysis of depositors’ behavior: i.e., 
from the depositors’ standpoint, the timeliness or extent of delays of a bank’s financial 
reporting is an exogenous bank characteristic that they take into account when they 
respond to the reporting.  Thus, regardless of the determinants of opacity, my main 
findings stand: uninsured depositors react more negatively to more delayed signals about 
bank asset quality, and the resulting effects are economically important and need to be 
taken into account when evaluating policies affecting banking loan loss provisioning 
model. 
 My study makes three contributions.  First, my study is among the first to 
examine how the timeliness of loan loss recognition affects a key and unexplored 
provider of capital for banks—uninsured depositors.  In particular, following calls for 
research on information asymmetry between banks and depositors (Beatty and Liao 2014; 
Bushman and Williams 2015), the paper confirms that bank reporting transparency, 
measured by timeliness of loan loss recognition, mitigates the information asymmetry 
problem for this important capital provider, which provides 70% of bank total assets 
(over $13 trillion in 2019), of which 40% is designated as uninsured (FDIC).  Second, my 
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study contributes to the debate on the optimality of bank opacity. Extant research is 
mixed on whether opacity is sometimes desirable (Acharya et al. 2009; Dudley 2009; 
Bank for International Settlements 2012; Dang, Gorton, and Holmstrom 2012; 
Holmstrom 2012; Gorton 2014; Admati 2016; Dang et al. 2017).  My findings suggest 
that lower reporting opacity helps banks attract more uninsured deposits, i.e. providing 
banks with more financing and liquidity hence enhancing stability (defined as the 
consistent ability for firms with positive net present value projects to obtain financing for 
those projects across the phases of the business or credit cycle (cycle) (Acharya and Ryan 
2016)).  Finally, this study contributes to research on the economic effects of loan loss 
provisioning by confirming that DELR can influence uninsured depositors’ monitoring 
and discipline (Beatty and Liao 2011; Bushman and Williams 2012, 2015).  
Understanding the effect of provisioning on bank financing is also important because the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board recently issued a rule that will eventually require 
banks to replace the incurred loss model with an expected loss model, which is intended 
to increase loan loss provision timeliness (FASB ASU 2016-13). 
 Section 2 presents the background, prior literature, and hypothesis development.  
Section 3 details the research design.  Section 4 presents descriptive statistics, and 
Section 5 the primary empirical results.  Section 6 presents alternative analyses, and 
Section 7 concludes. 
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2.   BACKGROUND, PRIOR LITERATURE, AND HYPOTHESIS 
DEVELOPMENT  
2.1  Background  
 Deposits can be decomposed into those insured by the Federal government, and 
those that are not.  The US federal government provides insurance through the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation, or FDIC.  The FDIC protects depositors of insured banks 
located in the US against the loss of their deposits if an insured bank fails.  FDIC 
insurance covers all deposit accounts, including checking and savings accounts, money 
market deposit accounts and certificates of deposit.  Prior to 2009Q3, the standard 
insurance amount was $100,000 per depositor, per insured bank, for each account 
ownership category.  However, on July 21, 2010, the signing of the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act permanently raised the standard maximum 
deposit insurance amount to $250,000.  Deposit amounts exceeding these indicated 
thresholds are uninsured deposits: that is, not covered by the FDIC if an insured bank 
fails.2  Of note, uninsured deposits have grown dramatically over the last twenty years, 
both in absolute and relative terms: after twenty years of generally steady growth, 
uninsured deposits in the US at 2019 sum to over $5.4 trillion, and comprise 41% of total 
bank deposits.3   
 
2  For example, Jane Doe has four single accounts at the same insured bank, including one account in 
the name of her business, which is a sole proprietorship.  The FDIC insures deposits owned by a 
sole proprietorship as the single account of the business owner.  Thus, the FDIC combines the four 
accounts (for example, totaling $260,000), with the balance up to $250,000 being insured, and the 
remainder ($10,000) being uninsured.   
3  At 2019, total US domestic deposits were $13,220 billion, of which $7,818 billion (59%) were 
insured by the FDIC, and $5,402 billion (41%) were not.  Note that the ratio of uninsured deposits 
to total domestic deposits has increased over the past two decades, from 26% in 1999 to 41% in 




 Relative to insured depositors, uninsured depositors differ in two key ways.  First, 
uninsured depositors face a lower likelihood of government guarantees, as their deposit 
amounts exceed the insurance limit set by the FDIC.4  Second, uninsured depositors 
likely have a greater ability to incur the necessary costs in monitoring bank activities.  
Prior research shows that most US uninsured deposits are held by the top 10% wealthiest 
(Wolff 2014) depositors.5  It is also likely that a large portion of uninsured deposits are 
held by businesses; I confirm this in my own conversations with bank officers.  
Collectively, these suggest that uninsured deposits (whether as wealthy individuals or 
businesses) are more likely to have both the incentives and resources to better monitor 
bank activities, as compared to insured depositors. 
 In the monitoring of bank activities, a key source of information are financial 
reports and regulatory filings, which provide bank-specific information to investors, 
creditors and regulators seeking to understand a bank’s fundamentals in order to guide 
investment and lending decisions, discipline risk-taking, and thus enhance stability.  Loan 
 
in the standard maximum deposit insurance amount from $100,000 to $250,000 in response to the 
global financial crisis. Source: https://www.fdic.gov/bank/statistical/stats/2019dec/fdic.pdf 
4  Of course, recalibrations of the maximum insurance coverage can reflect both unexpected 
economic events (e.g., financial crises) and related stop-gap measures (e.g., so-called “too big to 
fail” coverage provided to large banks).  While both suggest non-zero probabilities of potential 
government guarantees even if not explicitly covered by existing limits, I assume these 
probabilities remain below (likely substantially below) the effective 100% probability of 
governmental guarantees implied by explicit FDIC limits.   
5  For example, Wolff (2014) shows that about two-third of all deposits in the US are held by the top 
10% wealthiest individuals.  The paper also reveals that at 2013, liquid assets (bank deposits, 
money market funds, and cash surrender value of life insurance) account for 7.6% of total 
household wealth.  Further, the 10% (1%) wealthiest households have a net worth of $980,900 
($7,766,500).  In untabulated calculations, I estimate the average uninsured deposit account 
balance by dividing aggregate uninsured deposits dollars at all commercial banks by the number of 
uninsured deposit accounts after 2009Q3: this leads to an average uninsured deposit of over $1.3 
million.  Applying Wolff’s estimated liquid asset percentage, this suggests such depositors having 
average net worth of $17.1 million ($1.3 million / 7.6%), or more than double that of the top 1%.   
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loss provisioning is a key accounting policy choice that directly affects the volatility and 
cyclicality of bank earnings, banks’ regulatory capital, as well as loan portfolios’ risk 
attributes.  Of note, loan loss provisions are the largest component among accruals, 
averaging 56% of total accruals over 2005-2012 (Beatty and Liao, 2014).  The Financial 
Accounting Standard Board (FASB) and International Accounting Standard Board 
(IASB) have until recently followed the incurred loss model, which specifies that loan 
losses are recognized only when a loss is probable based on past events and conditions 
existing at the financial statement date.  However, the complexity of loan portfolios 
reporting suggests substantial scope for discretion within the prescribed rules.  For 
example, Beatty and Liao (2014) concludes, in assessing nine different loan loss models, 
that there is no consensus in banking research on how to best model discretionary 
provisions.  More recent studies on loan loss provisioning timeliness as a measure of 
bank opacity confirm its links with banks’ risk-taking behavior (Beatty and Liao, 2011; 
Bushman and Williams, 2012, 2015; Iannotta and Kwan, 2014; Bushman et al., 2016; 
Jiang and Levine, 2016; Dou et al., 2017; Costello et al., 2019; Gallemore, 2020).  I 
define and measure the timeliness of loan loss provisioning by the extent to which a bank 
delays recognizing current and future loan portfolio deteriorations when determining its 
loan loss provision (referred to as delayed expected loan loss recognition or DELR).  If a 
bank is slower to incorporate loan deteriorations into the provision, financial statement 
indicators (such as earnings and capital) will be less timely signals of bank problems, 
creating uncertainty about the bank’s fundamentals (Bushman and Williams 2015).  Prior 
research suggests that DELR is a powerful measure of financial reporting opacity that can 
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impair monitoring by bank stakeholders (Bushman and Williams 2012, 2015; Chen et al. 
2020; Gallemore 2020). 
2.2  Prior Literature  
 Banks play a particular role as efficient allocators of capital in the economy and 
providers of liquidity.  The asset side of the bank balance sheet reflects the supply of 
bank financing to the real economy, and is the product of private information collection, 
delegated monitoring activities, and capital allocation decisions (Bushman 2014).  Loans 
average 60% of banks’ total assets, and provide an important source of external financing 
to firms (Beatty and Liao 2014).  In private debt contracts—wherein banks represent 
creditors (i.e., lenders or capital providers), and firms/households represent debtors (i.e., 
borrowers or capital recipients)—banks require firms to bear the cost of agency conflicts 
between firm managers and banks.  When firms commit to timely and more transparent 
financial reporting and bond themselves against opportunistic discretion in the accounting 
rules, this leads to lower agency problem and thus lower financing costs for firms 
(Armstrong et al. 2010). 
 The liability and equity side of banks’ balance sheets reflects banks’ capital 
structure.  Similar to other industries, banks must attract outside funding in competitive 
markets, and deal with corporate governance issues deriving from self-interest and 
asymmetric information (Bushman 2014).  The most significant component of bank 
capital comes from deposits.  At 2012, deposits comprised 70–90% of bank total assets.6  
 
6   Broadly, this includes 50–70% core deposits and 20% noncore funding (Beatty and Liao 2014).  
Noncore funding includes large time deposits, deposits in foreign offices and subsidiaries, federal 
funds purchased, commercial paper, and brokered deposits. 
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The large role of deposits within bank capital structure raises the question of whether the 
providers of this capital (i.e., the depositors) seek to monitor and discipline banks, relying 
on banks’ financial reporting timeliness.  Prior research documents that depositors, and in 
particular uninsured and brokered depositors, withdraw funds when the bank’s condition 
deteriorates, consistent with monitoring (Goldberg and Hudgins 1996, 2002; Peria and 
Schmukler 2001; Davenport and McDill 2006; Iyer and Puri 2012; Iyer et al. 2013; 
Martin et al. 2018; Chen et al. 2020).  The question this study raises is how and why 
financial reporting opacity, measured by delayed expected loan loss recognition is 
associated with uninsured deposit financing.  Restated, does bank financial reporting 
opacity increases agency cost between bank managers and depositors? 
 Both theory and empirical research, which explore bank financial reporting 
opacity and its role in driving market discipline, present conflicting views.  On the one 
hand, credible public information about individual banks can enhance regulator and 
market participants’ ability to monitor and exert discipline on a bank's behavior.  The 
positive effects of transparency include: better corporate governance (Bushman and 
Smith 2001; Armstrong et al. 2010); greater bank stability through enhanced market 
discipline of banks’ risk-taking (Calomiris and Kahn 1991; Rochet 1992; Cordella and 
Yeyati 1998; Diamond and Rajan 2001; Blum 2002); mitigating depositors’ and other 
short-term lenders’ uncertainty about the solvency of individual banks (Gorton and 
Huang 2006; Ratnovski 2013); and reducing financing frictions created by asymmetric 
information between bank managers and investors (Beatty and Liao 2011; Bushman and 
Williams 2015).  Alternatively, endogenous costs arising from transparency can be 
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detrimental to the banking system.  These negative effects include: inefficient bank runs 
due to coordination failures (Morris and Shin 2002; Chen and Hasan 2006); reputational 
contagion in the bank regulators (Morrison and White 2013); adverse incentives of bank 
managers (Goldstein and Sapra 2014); restricting interbank risk-sharing arrangements 
(Goldstein and Leitner 2013); and undermining banks' ability to produce private money 
(Gorton 2014; Dang et al. 2017). 
 Beatty and Liao (2014) review the empirical research of how banks and 
accounting information address information problems in the economy, primarily focusing 
on asymmetric information between banks and equity investors, and those between banks 
and regulators.  Of note, the paper calls for research on the information asymmetry 
between depositors (i.e., creditors) and banks (i.e., borrowers) about the bank’s 
monitoring quality and performance, arguing that this information asymmetry arises due 
to banks’ delegated monitoring role.  This role leads to possible agency problems, to the 
extent banks fail to fully internalize either the cost of their risk-taking or the benefit of 
their monitoring efforts.  This suggests opacity as a side effect of banks’ lending 
activities, thereby leading to a potential role for accounting information in addressing 
bank-depositor information asymmetry.  Bushman and Williams (2015) similarly calls 
for research on the possible negative relation between opacity and both the access to and 
terms demanded by credit funding (e.g., Kashyap and Stein 1995, 2000; Ratnovski 2013).  
Acharya and Ryan (2016) reviews the empirical literature on the relation between banks’ 
financial reporting and financial system stability, and also calls for additional empirical 




 Prior research examines depositor discipline, confirming that depositors punish 
banks’ additional risks by withdrawing deposits and/or requiring higher interest rates 
(e.g., Berger 1991; Peria and Schmukler 2001).  For example, prior papers document that 
large uninsured certificates of deposits reflect higher interest costs for banks exhibiting 
higher risk-taking (Brewer and Mondschean 1994; Cook and Spellman 1994; Francis et 
al. 2005).  Prior work also shows that the amount of uninsured deposits declines as a 
bank’s risk increases (e.g., Goldberg and Hudgins 1996, 2002; Billett et al. 1998; Park 
and Peristiani 1998; Maechler and McDill 2006; Hasan et al. 2013).  Finally, Berger and 
Turk-Ariss (2015) documents significant depositor discipline preceding the 2008 global 
financial crisis in both the US and EU, and that discipline mostly decreases during the 
crisis. 
  While a potential consequence of reporting opacity is reduced market discipline 
of banks’ risk-taking, little work examines the relation between bank financial reporting 
opacity and uninsured deposit financing.  Most extant work either combines insured and 
uninsured deposits, examines sample periods preceding the 2010 insurance limit change 
from $100,000 to $250,000, or assesses bank transparency as quantity of disclosure, 
being listed, or various risk factors.7  One exception is McIntyre and Zhang (2020), 
which uses US commercial banks’ data from 2001 to 2010 and finds that depositors 
 
7  Risk factors include bank financial statement indicators such as leverage, non-performing loans, 
and volatility in ROA.  They also include measures such as balance-sheet-based Z-scores, or 
market measures such as return volatility, Merton 1974 ’s distance-to-default, value-at-risk, or 
rating agencies’ credit ratings.   
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withdraw deposits at banks engaging in discretionary accounting practices (measured by 
the estimates of discretionary loan loss provisions), consistent with the theory of positive 
effects of transparency on market discipline.  My study differs from McIntyre and Zhang 
(2020) in that it focuses on the timeliness of loan loss recognition (DELR is a powerful 
measure of financial reporting opacity that impairs monitoring by bank stakeholders 
(Bushman and Williams 2012, 2015)).  The second difference is my study is motivated 
by the differential incentives and resources between insured and uninsured depositors.  A 
working paper (Chen et al. (2020)) uses data for US commercial banks from 1994 to 
2013 and focuses on the information quality aspect of bank earnings transparency 
(measured as the ability of its main components to predict future bank loan write-offs 
which arguably a less discretionary measure of bank asset quality).  The findings of the 
working paper suggest that depositors respond more strongly to the information quality of 
bank performance , consistent with the theory of optimal opacity of banks in creating 
private money and the endogenous cost of transparency (Dang et al. 2017).  The 
conflicting views in both prior theory and empirical research of bank reporting opacity 
suggest a need for more research to reveal insights into whether and how bank opacity 
affects bank deposit financing (Bushman 2014; Acharya and Ryan 2016).  Accordingly, 
my research aims to evaluate the link between bank reporting opacity and potential 
disciplining by the largest capital providers for banks—depositors (Beatty and Liao 2014; 
Bushman 2014; Bushman and Williams 2015).   
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2.3  Hypothesis Development 
The direction of the association between DELR and uninsured deposit financing is 
not clear ex ante.  On the one hand, opaque financial reporting choices, and DELR 
specifically, could help banks in carrying out its role in creating safe, money-like 
securities  ̶  uninsured deposits demanded by depositors because such securities help 
depositors share liquidity risks and create medium of exchange without fear of adverse 
selection (Diamond and Dybvig 1983; Gorton and Pennacchi 1990; Goldstein and 
Pauzner 2005).  Therefore, uninsured depositors may provide more financing to banks 
that appear slow to recognize expected loan losses, leading to a positive association 
between DELR and uninsured deposit financing.   
Alternatively, the association between DELR and uninsured deposit financing can 
be negative, in that DELR reduces bank transparency which can impair monitoring by 
bank outsiders.  A bank’s primary asset is its loan portfolio, and therefore understanding 
a bank’s performance and solvency depends on having accurate and timely information 
regarding loan losses.  Uninsured depositors base their monitoring in part on signals, such 
as capital ratios and earnings, obtained from regulatory filings (Call Reports).  Loan loss 
provisioning significantly impacts these key signals of bank health (Bushman and 
Williams 2012).  DELR can negatively impact depositors’ awareness of problems by 
reducing the extent to which capital and earnings reflect bank fundamentals in a timely 
manner.  Furthermore, DELR can negatively impact how depositors interpret non-accrual 
measures such as non-performing loans and can create uncertainty over the ability of the 
bank’s capital to cover unexpected losses (Bushman and Williams 2015).  In sum, DELR 
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can negatively impact monitoring by depositors by creating uncertainty about the bank’s 
fundamentals, resulting in a lower uninsured deposit financing.     
Bank financial reporting opacity also relies on the active efforts of information 
receivers as dictated by their incentives to gather, interpret, and impound available 
information into decision-making processes (Freixas and Laux 2012; Mehran and 
Mollineaux 2012).  Besides having significant incentives, uninsured depositors likely 
have an ability to incur the necessary costs to monitor bank activities.  This is because 
uninsured depositors likely reflect either high net worth individuals, corporations, or 
institutions—all entities having greater resources to cover expected monitoring costs.  
This includes direct monitoring via analysis of bank disclosures and financial data, as 
well as indirect monitoring through proxy (such as via financial advisors).   
Uninsured depositors may respond to elevated bank risk-taking by requiring 
higher interest rates or withdrawing deposits (Berger 1991; Peria and Schmukler 2001).  
Banks typically do not separately report interest rates on insured versus uninsured 
deposits; in addition, prior research documents that the quantity effect is stronger than 
interest rate effect (Park and Peristiani 1998).  Accordingly, I focus on the quantity effect: 
that is, the amount of uninsured deposits and the ratio of uninsured deposits to total 
assets.      
If bank financial reporting opacity inhibits uninsured depositor monitoring and 
discipline, I predict the following relation between the extent of delayed expected loss 
recognition (as a proxy for bank reporting opacity, with higher values suggesting higher 
opacity) and the level of uninsured deposit financing of banks: 
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H1 Banks’ reporting opacity (proxied via delays in expected loss recognition) is 
negatively associated with uninsured deposits financing.  
Various characteristics (such as explicit or implicit government guarantees) can dampen 
the incentives for uninsured depositors to exercise monitoring (Nier and Baumann 2006; 
Furlong and Williams 2006; Acharya et al. 2016).  Similarly, the costs associated with 
monitoring—such as information gathering and processing—may outweigh any 
perceived benefits.  Combined, both issues should bias against the predicted negative 
association. 
 Next, I predict two cross-sectional bank attributes as leading to variation in the 
information environment across banks.  First, I expect that the exercise of depositors’ 
discipline will be stronger when implicit government guarantees are not perceived to 
exist (Kroszner 2016).  Banks perceived as “too big to fail” (TBTF) are often viewed as 
having implicit government guarantees, suggesting a lower sensitivity of uninsured 
depositors to elevated bank risk.  In contrast, for those banks falling outside of this 
designation (i.e., “non-TBTF”), I predict uninsured depositors will exhibit greater 
sensitivity to elevated risk.  Furthermore, stress test requirement for banks designated as 
TBTF should increase depositors' confidence that these banks will be in a position to 
repay depositors.8  Thus, I predict:     
H2A The effect of reporting opacity (proxied via delays in expected loss recognition) 
is more negative for non-TBTF banks relative to TBTF banks. 
 Second, I expect that private banks face higher information asymmetry between 
 
8  The Dodd-Frank Act in 2010 stipulates that banks with total assets exceeding $10 billion must 
conduct an annual stress test.  On October 10, 2019, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(OCC) revised the minimum stress test threshold for national banks and Federal savings 
associations from $10 billion to $250 billion. 
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banks and depositors as compared to public banks, as the latter have richer reporting 
environments arising from mandated public filings.  This suggests that private banks are 
less likely to overcome financial market imperfections, and thus lack access to external 
funds as compared to publicly-traded banks (Holod and Peek 2007).  Accordingly, I also 
predict:    
H2B The effect of reporting opacity (proxied via delays in expected loss recognition) 





3.   RESEARCH DESIGN  
3.1  Dependent Variables: Uninsured Deposits 
  I define two dependent variables to measure the level of uninsured deposit 
financing.  First, I use the natural log of quarterly uninsured deposits 
(Ln(Uninsured_Deposits)); logging minimizes the effects of outlier values.  Second, I use 
the ratio of uninsured deposits to total assets (Uninsured_Deposits%); the scaled measure 
helps to address any effect of different bank sizes (Nier and Baumann 2006).  These two 
measures capture the level of financing uninsured depositors provide to banks.  
  I focus on the level versus growth rate of uninsured deposits, as bank reporting 
opacity (proxied via my experimental variable of DELR) is likely time-invariant within 
banks: for example, no prior research using DELR as a proxy for bank opacity includes 
bank fixed effects.  Accordingly, my measure plausibly captures the cross-sectional 
differences in financing across banks.  I focus on uninsured (versus insured or total) 
deposits, as uninsured depositors are predicted to differ in terms of their incentives, costs, 
and benefits of monitoring and disciplining of banks’ risk-taking.  Following Berger and 
Turk-Ariss (2015), I calculate uninsured deposits by taking all funds in large deposit 
accounts that are partially insured, and subtracting any insured amounts.  This latter 
calculation incorporates changes in the FDIC’s insured deposit limit that occur during the 
sample period.9   
 
9   In particular, uninsured deposits is calculated as follows for the identified quarters: 
(i) before 2006Q2: ($ Deposit Accts > $100 K) − $100 K * (# Deposit Accts > $100 K);   
(ii) 2006Q2-2009Q2: ($ Deposit Accts > $100 K) − $100 K * (# Deposit Accts > $100 K) + ($ 
Retirement Deposit Accts > $250 K) − $250 K * (# Retirement Deposit Accts > $250 K); 
(iii) 2009Q3 onward: ($ Deposit Accts > $250 K) − $250 K * (# Deposit Accts > $250 K) + ($ 
Retirement Deposit Accts > $250 K) − $250 K * (# Retirement Deposit Accts > $250 K). 
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3.2  Experimental Variable: Delayed Expected Loss Recognition (DELR) 
 Following Bushman and Williams (2015), the primary experimental variable to 
proxy for accounting transparency is delayed expected loss recognition (DELR).  This 
measure reflects that more-timely banks recognize loan loss provisions concurrently with 
or in advance of loans becoming nonperforming; conversely, less-timely banks recognize 
loan loss provision after loans become nonperforming (Nichols et al. 2009; Beatty and 
Liao 2011; and Bushman and Williams 2012, 2015).  Following prior research (Beatty 
and Liao 2011; Bushman and Williams 2015) I generate bank-quarter estimates of DELR.  
Bushman and Williams (2015) argues that DELR captures opportunistic loan 
provisioning behavior; as such, higher values of DELR reduce bank transparency, create 
expected loss overhangs, and increase creditors’ information uncertainty about the future 
cash flows of the bank.  Accordingly, for each bank-quarter, I estimate the following two 
equations using a 12-quarter rolling window (i.e., observations of the past 3 years), 
within which I require at least 8 observations to run each regression below.10   
LLPit = β0 + β1 ΔNPLit-2 + β2 ΔNPLit-1 + β3 Tier1it-1 + β4 EBLLPit + β5 Sizeit-1 +  
β6 RealEstate%it + β7 CommIndust%it + εit      (1) 
LLPit = β0 + β1 ΔNPLit-2 + β2 ΔNPLit-1 + β3 Tier1it-1 + β4 EBLLPit + β5 Sizeit-1 +  
β6 RealEstate%it + β7 CommIndust%it + β8 ΔNPLit + β9 ΔNPLit+1 + εit   (2) 
LLPit is the loan loss provisions scaled by lagged total loans of bank i in quarter t; ΔNPL 
is the change in nonperforming loans scaled by lagged total loans; Tier1 is the tier 1 
capital ratio; EBLLP is earnings before loan loss provision scaled by lagged total loans; 
 
10  Results are robust to alternatively requiring at least 6 or 10 observations. 
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Size is the natural log of total assets; RealEstate% is real estate loans scaled by total 
loans; and CommIndust% is commercial and industrial loans scaled by total loans.  (See 
Appendix A for definitions.) 
 Following Bushman and Williams (2015), I first compute the incremental R2 by 
subtracting the adjusted-R2 of Equation (1) (i.e., the “More Delay Model”) from that of 
Equation (2) (i.e., the “Less Delay Model”).  A negative (positive) incremental R2 is 
consistent with more (less) delays in the recognition of expected losses.  I categorize each 
bank quarter based on their incremental R2; thus, DELR is an indicator variable equal to 1 
for bank-quarter with negative incremental R2, and 0 otherwise.  That is, DELR equals 1 
for those banks that most aggressively delay loss recognition, and thus exhibit higher 
reporting opacity.   
 My derivation also incorporates innovations recommended by Acharya and Ryan 
(2016), which raises several research design issues regarding the DELR measure and its 
use to examine bank financial reporting and stability.  First, the paper argues that loan 
portfolio composition can affect the timeliness of provisions for loan losses.  Bhat, Lee 
and Ryan (2019) finds that banks record less timely provisions for loan losses for 
commercial and industrial loans than for mortgages such as real estate loans, since the 
former are more heterogeneous.  The paper also finds that banks record higher 
allowances for loan losses for uncollateralized loans (e.g., consumer loans) than for 
collateralized loans (e.g., real estate loans).  Acharya and Ryan (2016) recommends 
incorporating two aspects of banks’ loan portfolio composition: the proportions of 
heterogeneous versus homogenous loans, and of collateralized versus uncollateralized 
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loans.  Therefore, I include RealEstate% and CommIndust% in Equations (1) and (2) to 
better capture the loan portfolio composition (and thus, the timeliness of banks’ loan loss 
recognition).  Second, I extend Beatty and Liao (2011)’s sample selection 
recommendation to include smaller banks: in particular, those having assets smaller than 
$500 million.  These smaller banks constitute a significant part of the banking system 
(e.g., exceeding 79% of my sample observations); more importantly, such banks are 
likely more sensitive to external financing frictions.  Third, I include two additional 
control variables as suggested by Acharya and Ryan (2016) in my main regression 
(discussed in Section 3.3 below).    
3.3  Regression 
 To test whether bank reporting opacity affects uninsured deposit financing, I 
examine differences in the association between quarterly uninsured deposits and the 
extent of delays in expected loss recognition using the following OLS regression:    
 UnInsDeposit = β0 + β1DELRit-1 + Σ γ BankFundamentalsit-1 + β2LargeDepositRateit   
   + β3ΔLoanit + β4Ln(StatePersonalInc)it + Year-Quarter FE + εit  (3) 
where the dependent variable, UnInsDeposit, alternatively equals 
Ln(Uninsured_Deposits)it or Uninsured_Deposits%it, as defined above. 
  The experimental variable is DELR as defined above.  Consistent with recent 
research on market discipline and bank financial reporting, I measure DELR and bank-level 
control variables with a lag (Brown and Dinç 2005, 2011; Akins et al. 2016; Ng and 
Roychowdhury 2014; Balla et al. 2015; Bushman and Williams, 2015; Gallemore 2020).  
Following H1, I predict a negative coefficient on DELR if uninsured deposits decline with 
banks’ reporting opacity.  Restated, a negative coefficient on DELR is consistent with 
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delayed expected loan loss recognition reflecting lower uninsured deposit financing.  To 
mitigate the concern of banks with low previous uninsured deposit amounts having 
incentives to make themselves more attractive to such depositors by presenting loan loss 
provisions that are more timely, I use a lagged value of DELR.     
 I include a vector of control variables (BankFundamentals), following prior 
research (Peria and Schmukler 2001; Beyhaghi et al. 2014; Berger and Turk-Ariss 2015; 
Acharya and Mora 2015; McIntyre and Zhang 2020).  All are defined as one-quarter-
lagged bank risk characteristics.  The variables reflect the so-called CAMELS rating 
system of banks, which stands for capital adequacy, asset quality, management, earnings, 
liquidity, and sensitivity.  Deteriorating CAMELS indicators signal increased bank risk.  
Accordingly, I control for capital adequacy (Tier1); as banks with lower risk (reflected in 
higher capital ratios) may be more attractive to uninsured depositors, the predicted sign is 
positive.  Alternatively, banks with higher equity ratios are mechanically less funded with 
non-equity financing (including uninsured deposits); this suggests a negative predicted 
sign.  Accordingly, I do not predict the sign for this risk proxy.  I next control for asset 
quality using non-performing loans (NPL), with a negative predicted sign.  I also control 
for: management quality using earnings before loan loss provisions (EBLLP), earnings 
performance (ROA), and liquidity (Liquidity%); all have positive predicted signs.  
Sensitivity with loan concentration is controlled for by including real estate lending 
(RealEstate%), with a negative predicted sign.  Finally, I include Size (defined as the 
natural log of total assets) to control for unspecified bank scale effects, with a positive 
predicted sign.   
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 I also include LargeDepositRate (measured as interest expense on large deposits 
divided by the quarterly average of large time deposits, expressed in annual percentage 
terms) to control for the level of interest paid on large time deposits.  If banks are 
successful in attracting more uninsured deposits by raising interest rates, the predicted 
sign is positive.  Alternatively, prior research suggests that larger banks can raise deposits 
at a lower cost (e.g., Acharya and Ryan 2016), consistent with perceptions of lower risk 
for such banks; this suggests a negative predicted sign.  Accordingly, I do not predict the 
coefficient sign for LargeDepositRate.  I also include two additional control variables 
suggested by Acharya and Ryan (2016): ΔLoan (change in the natural log of loans) to 
control for changes in the loan supply by banks; and Ln(StatePersonalInc) (natural log of 
real personal income for the bank’s state of incorporation) to control for the demand for 
deposits and banks’ economic aspects.  Both have predicted positive signs.  Finally, I 
include time-series quarter fixed-effects (Year-QuarterFE) to control for macroeconomic 
and banking sector developments common across banks.  All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the top and bottom 1%.   
3.4  Cross-Sectional Analyses 
 I test the cross-sectional hypotheses by assessing the incremental impact on the 
DELR coefficients for the respective partitions using the following regression: 
 UnInsDeposit = β0 + β1DELRit-1 + β2CrossSectit + β3DELRit-1*CrossSectit   
 + Controls + Quarter FE + εit      (4) 
Specifically, I interact DELR with the two predicted cross-sectional bank characteristics 
(CrossSect), defined as the following two alternate indicator variables.   I test H2A using 
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NonTBTF, which equals 1 if the bank is not too-big to fail, and 0 otherwise (i.e., is too-
big-to-fail).  For each quarter-year, banks above the upper 10th percentile of total assets 
are designated as TBTF banks; the remainder are designated as NonTBTF banks.  I test 
H2B using Private, which equals 1 if the bank is not publicly-traded, and 0 otherwise (i.e., 
is publicly-traded).  I use the PERMCO-RSSD link table from the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York to identify public banks.11   
Consistent with my cross-sectional predictions, I test H2A by examining if the 
coefficient on DELR*NonTBTF is negative; and I test H2B by examining if the coefficient 
on DELR*Private is negative.   
4.   SAMPLE SELECTION AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 Table 1 Panel A presents the sample selection.  I collect quarterly data for all US 
commercial banks from Bank Call reports in the Bank Regulatory Database for the period 
1994Q1–2013Q4.  I chose 1994 as the starting point as this is the first year after full 
implementation of both risk-based capital and the FDIC Improvement Act of 1991 
(FDICIA).  I obtain real personal income by state from the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(BEA), adjusted for both inflation and using BEA's regional price parities to better 
 
11  This dataset links regulatory identification numbers (RSSD ID) from the National Information 
Center (NIC) to the permanent company number (PERMCO) used in the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) from June 30, 1986 to December 31, 2018.  The RSSD ID is a unique 
identifier assigned to commercial banks or bank holding companies by the Federal Reserve and is 
the primary identifier of entities in regulatory reports such as the Call Report (FFIEC031) and Y9-
C.  The PERMCO is a unique and permanent company identification number assigned to publicly-
traded institutions in the CRSP database.  While a company may change its name, ticker, exchange, 
or CUSIP, the PERMCO will remain the same. In CRSP, companies with multiple tranches of 
publicly traded stock will be assigned to multiple PERMNOs.  These PERMNOs will be linked 
back to a single PERMCO. Linking the RSSD ID to PERMCO allows researchers to match bank 
regulatory data with financial market data. 
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compare the buying power of personal income across the 50 states and the District of 
Columbia.  The initial sample consists of 713,228 bank-quarter observations.12  The final 
sample after applying several filters is 149,330 bank-quarter observations, representing 
7,185 distinct banks for the period 1994Q1–2013Q4.  
 Table 1 Panel B provides the distribution by three groups defined by bank total 
assets: “small banks” (those with assets from $100 million to $1 billion); “medium 
banks” (those with assets from $1 billion to $5 billion); and “large banks” (those with 
assets exceeding $5 billion).  The small, medium, and large bank groupings account for 
91%, 7% and 2% of the sample, and exhibit uninsured to total deposits of 19.4%, 27.5% 
and 31.7%, respectively.   
 Table 2 Panel A presents the descriptive statistics.  Sample banks have average 
quarterly uninsured deposits of $125 million, representing 16.5% of total assets.  On 
average, 29.2% of banks have negative incremental R2 (DELR = 1) in a quarter.  Average 
tier 1 ratio (Tier1) is 14.4%, nonperforming loan ratio (NPL) is 1.3%, real estate loans 
(RealEstate%) account for 71.5% of total loans, and the liquid assets ratio (Liquidity%) is 
26.6%.  The average large deposit rate (LargeDepositRate%) in annual percentage term is 
3.8%.  81.5% of my sample is private banks (Private) and 16.1% is stand-alone and not 
 
12  To derive the final sample, I exclude the following: (i) banks with 50% or greater foreign 
ownership, and not incorporated in the 50 states or District of Columbia; (ii) observations with 
total asset growth exceeding 10% in any quarter to mitigate effects that may be driven by mergers 
and acquisitions (Gatev and Strahan 2006); (iii) banks that are inactive in the loan market, defined 
as those with maximum loans-to-assets ratios of less than 5%; (iv) banks with assets of less than 
$100 million, which are likely viewed as the riskiest banks by uninsured depositors and have the 
smallest percentage of uninsured deposits (12%, as compared to 32% in largest bank group of more 
than $5 billion in assets); (v) banks lacking 8-quarters for each bank-quarter for the rolling window 
calculations; and (vi) observations with missing values for main regressions.   
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affiliated with a bank holding company (StandAlone).  On average, banks in my sample 
have earnings ratio to total loans (EBLLP) of 0.9% and ROA (ROA) of 1%. 
 Table 2 Panel B partitions the sample into two groups DELR=1 and DELR=0 and 
compares variables across the groups.  As compared to banks with less delays (DELR = 
0), banks with more delays (DELR = 1) exhibit lower uninsured deposits 
(Ln(Uninsured_Deposits)) and lower percentage of uninsured deposits in total assets 
(Uninsured_Deposits%), higher tier 1 capital (Tier1), lower non-performing loan ratio 
(NPL), higher real estate loans ratio (RealEstate%), lower earnings before loan loss 
provisions (EBLLP), higher ROA (ROA), higher liquidity assets ratio (Liquidity%), 
smaller assets size (Size), lower interest rate (LargeDepositRate%), lower loan growth 
(ΔLoan), and lower state personal income (Ln(StatePersonalInc)).  These mean 
comparisons suggest that the control variables differ significantly across the two DELR 
groups, further justifying their inclusion in my analyses. 
 Table 3 presents the correlations.  Consistent with my hypotheses, both dependent 
variables (Ln(Uninsured_Deposits), Uninsured_Deposits%) have significant negative 
correlations with delays in expected loss recognition (DELR).  Further, the table confirms 
the expected negative correlations between my uninsured deposit variables with 
nonperforming loans (NPL), real estate loans (RealEstate%), and expected positive 
correlations with earnings (EBLLP), ROA, bank size (Size), loan growth (ΔLoan), and 
state personal income (Ln(StatePersonalInc).  The dependent variables have significant 
negative correlations with Tier1 and LargeDepositRate in this univariate analysis.  
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Liquidity% is negatively correlated with Ln(Uninsured_Deposits) but positively 




5.   EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
5.1  Bank Opacity and Uninsured Deposit Financing 
 Table 4 presents results examining uninsured deposit financing as related to 
opacity, proxied via DELR (delayed expected loss recognition).  In Columns (1) and (2), 
the dependent variable is Ln(Uninsured_Deposits)it, the natural log of uninsured deposits 
of bank i in quarter t.  Column (1) presents the univariate test, revealing the predicted 
significantly negative coefficient on DELR (–0.173, t-stat = 25.27).  Column (2) presents 
the multivariate test with similar results (DELR = –0.037; t-stat = 6.43).   
Control variables all obtain the predicted signs.  This includes significantly 
negative coefficients for: Tier1 (–2.389; t-stat = 15.19), suggesting a substitute financing 
between equity and non-equity; RealEstate% (–0.600; t-stat = 13.29), suggesting 
uninsured depositors monitor and are sensitive to banks’ asset quality; and 
LargeDepositRate (–7.454; t-stat = 11.17), suggesting that uninsured depositors perceive 
banks having to pay higher interests (higher risk premium) as more risky.  Similarly, I 
find the expected positive coefficients for: EBLLP (0.021; t-stat = 1.77), consistent with 
higher uninsured deposits for more profitable banks; ROA (7.934; t-stat =14.56), 
consistent with uninsured deposits increasing for better managed banks; and Liquidity% 
(0.533; t-stat = 9.07), consistent with higher uninsured deposits for more liquid banks.  I 
also find higher uninsured deposits for banks that are larger (Size = 1.115; t-stat = 
153.47), have higher loan growth (ΔLoan = 1.242; t-stat = 17.00), and operating in states 
with higher personal income (Ln(StatePersonalInc) = 0.044; t-stat = 5.69).  The 
coefficient on NPL is negative but insignificant.   
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 In Columns (3) and (4), the dependent variable is Uninsured_Deposits%it, the 
ratio of uninsured deposits to the total assets of bank i in quarter t.  Thus, these columns 
replicate the analyses now using a scaled version of uninsured deposits.  Results are 
similar to those reported above.  I find a significantly negative coefficient on DELR in the 
univariate analysis of Column (3) (–0.007, t-stat = 14.22), as well as in the multivariate 
analysis of Column (4) (–0.008; t-stat = 9.09).  The association between DELR and 
uninsured deposits is also economically significant.  Referring to Column (4), I find that 
banks with DELR = 1 (i.e., more delays) have 0.8 percentage points lower uninsured 
deposits to total assets, where the sample mean equals 16.5%.  This represents $5 million 
less uninsured deposits in a quarter of the sample with mean assets of $625 million.  
Results on the control variables attain the same predicted positive and negative 
coefficients as discussed above.   
Overall, these results provide consistent support for H1, and suggest banks with 
higher opacity (i.e., those exhibiting higher DELR) exhibit decreased levels of uninsured 
deposits, consistent with bank opacity reduces uninsured deposit financing.     
5.2  Cross-Sectional Analyses 
 Table 5 presents the cross-sectional analyses of uninsured deposits, and thus my 
tests of H2A and H2B.  Focusing on Column (1) using Ln(Uninsured_Deposits) and 
Column (3) using Uninsured_Deposits% as dependent variables to test H2A, I find as 
predicted that the negative association between uninsured deposits and higher bank 
opacity is more prevalent among banks, which are not too big to fail (NonTBTF) 
(coefficient on NonTBTF*DELR = –0.045; t-stat = 2.12 in Column (1), –0.021; t-stat = 
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5.42 in Column (3)).  All other coefficients on control variables are similar to the main 
regressions in Table 4.   
 Tests of H2B are in Columns (2) and (4), using the same two alternative dependent 
variables.  I only find a significantly negative effect on Private*DELR in Column (4), 
using Uninsured_Deposits% as dependent variable (–0.006; t-stat = 2.27).  The 
coefficient on the interaction term in Column (2), using Ln(Uninsured_Deposits) as 
dependent variable, is positive but insignificant (0.017; t-stat = 1.12).  These results 
provide limited evidence that the link between uninsured deposit to assets ratio and 
higher opacity is more prominent among private banks relative to publicly traded banks, 
partially supporting H2B. 
 Overall, I conclude that the negative association between uninsured deposits and 
higher bank opacity exhibits predictable cross-sectional variation.  Specifically, I find 
lower uninsured deposits for banks unlikely to be designated as too big to fail (consistent 
with H2A); and some support for lower uninsured deposits for private banks (consistent 
with H2B).   
5.3  Sensitivity Analyses 
 I perform several sensitivity analyses to assess the robustness of my results to 
alternative research design choices.  First, I examine an alternative proxy for my 
experimental variable, which is a regression-based DELR measure.  In particular, I use a 
stock measure (DELR_Stock1) based on the ratio of the allowance of loan loss provisions 
divided by nonperforming loans (Beatty and Liao 2011).  This ratio captures banks’ 
recognition of expected risk in their performing loans, as well as incurred losses in their 
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nonperforming loans.  While less intuitive in capturing the extent of delays in expected 
loss recognition, this measure does not require time-series data as the regression-based 
DELR measure does; this places fewer time-series imposed limitations on sample 
selection.  I expect that banks with a smaller delay in expected loss recognition will 
recognize greater loan provisions relative to nonperforming loans.  Accordingly, I 
designate banks with a lagged ratio higher (lower) than the median during the quarter as 
having a smaller (greater) delay in expected loss recognition.  As a second measure, I 
follow Akins et al. (2017) and modify the Beatty and Liao (2011) stock measure by 
computing the ratio of the allowance of loan loss provisions at quarter t as a percentage of 
the nonperforming loans at quarter t+1 for each bank-quarter observation 
(DELR_Stock2).13  The correlation between the two DELR stock measures is 70%.  Table 
6 presents results using DELR_Stock1, which are unchanged to my primary results using 
DELR.14  Results using DELR_Stock2 (Table 11) are virtually identical to those using 
DELR_Stock1, and continue to support the primary findings. 
 Second, I examine the sensitivity of my results to the time-series of observations 
used to define the primary experimental variable of DELR.  The primary analyses use at 
least 8 previous quarters; I alternatively require at least 6 or 10 quarterly observations for 
Equations (1) and (2) to construct DELR.  Table 7 presents the results, using the 
dependent variables of Ln(Uninsured_Deposits) in Columns (1) and (2), and 
 
13  This latter ratio captures the extent to which loan loss allowances at time t take into account the 
current levels of and future changes in nonperforming loans (since nonperforming loans at time 
t+1 equals nonperforming loans at time t plus the changes in nonperforming loans at time t+1).   
14  Note that N differs within this and the ensuring sensitivity analyses due to different data 
requirements.  However, results for all sensitivity analyses are unchanged to using the same 
primary sample (i.e., N = 149,330). 
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Uninsured_Deposits% in Columns (3) and (4).  Results are unchanged to using either 6 
or 10 quarters: the coefficient on DELR is consistently significantly negative across all 
four specifications.   
 Third, I redefine my dependent variables to be the ratio of uninsured deposits to 
total deposits (Uninsured/Total_Deposits) (versus as a ratio of total assets in the primary 
analyses), and to be the natural log of the change in uninsured deposits 
(Ln(ΔUninsured_Deposits)) (versus the natural log of the level in uninsured deposits in 
the primary analyses).  Results are presented in Table 8, and remain unchanged to the 
primary analyses: the coefficient on DELR remains significantly negative across all four 




6.   ADDITIONAL ANALYSES 
6.1  Uninsured Deposit Financing during Recessionary Periods 
 Beatty and Liao (2011) provides evidence that banks with greater delays in 
expected loss recognition reduce their lending during recessions more than banks with 
smaller delays.  Accordingly, I predict that the primary negative association between 
uninsured deposits and delays in expected loss recognition to be accentuated (i.e., more 
negative) during recessions, consistent with those banks being more financially 
constrained, less likely to meet their liquidity demand, and thus reducing lending more.  
Table 9 presents the results.  Column (1) has the recession year observations for periods 
between 2001Q2–2001Q4 and 2008Q1–2009Q2, and Column (2) the non-recession year 
observations for periods other than recessionary periods; that is, I define recessions using 
data from the National Bureau of Economic Research.  Results are consistent with 
expectations.  In particular, the coefficient on DELR is –0.042 (t-stat = 4.86) in Column 
(1) for recessionary observations, and –0.029 (t-stat = 4.65) in Column (2) for non-
recessionary observations (with the difference significant at F = 8.52, p-value < 0.001), 
suggesting a more negative effect on uninsured deposits at banks with more delays during 
recessionary periods.   
6.2  Uninsured Deposit Financing by Bank Size Quartiles 
 Previously, I define TBTF banks as the upper 10th percentile of total assets, with 
Table 5 results confirming the expected stronger negative relation between uninsured 
deposits and bank opacity for NonTBTF compared to TBTF banks.  However, the 
distribution of my sample is heavily skewed to smaller banks: for example, 90% of my 
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sample includes banks smaller than $1 billion in total assets.  Accordingly, I extend my 
analysis to examine the relation between uninsured deposits and bank reporting opacity 
across four equally-sized bank quartiles by total assets.  Table 10 presents the results.  
The coefficients on DELR are significantly negative across the first three quartiles: from 
Column (1) (smallest banks) to Column (3), it is –0.074 (t-stat = 6.67), –0.027 (t-stat = 
2.70), and –0.033 (t-stat = 3.19), respectively.  In Column (4) for the largest bank 
quartile, the coefficient on DELR is negative but insignificant (–0.002; t-stat = 0.15).  
Collectively, these results are consistent with the TBTF hypothesis of implicit 
government guarantee lowering the sensitivity of uninsured depositors to banks’ risk-
taking for the largest banks.  Further, the results confirm that the negative association 
between uninsured deposits and bank opacity appears consistent across the three bottom 
quartiles of banks: that is, it appears widely-distributed across banks below the largest 
grouping.   
 Finally, a potential concern is that the primary sample excludes the smallest banks 
with total assets less than $100 million, while those banks should be most sensitive to 
uninsured depositing funding.  In untabulated analysis, I include all banks in my sample, 
confirming that the results are unchanged to my primary analyses (coefficients on DELR 
are –0.032 (t-stat = 6.39) and –0.008 (t-stat = 13.15) corresponding to the two dependent 
variables in primary analyses) (Table 12). 
6.3  Uninsured Deposit Financing and Bank Holding Company 
 I examine the difference in bank affiliation with a parent holding company.  
Extant literature shows that such affiliations (i.e., a multibank-holding company) enhance 
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the availability of internal financing for operations relative to stand-alone banks (Houston 
et al. 1997; Campello 2002).  This suggests that the effect of bank reporting opacity on 
uninsured deposits will be stronger for stand-alone banks as compared to banks affiliated 
with a multibank-holding company. 
 I test this prediction using StandAlone, defined as 1 if the bank is a stand-alone 
bank and not part of a bank holding company, and 0 otherwise.  I follow Holod and Peek 
(2007) and separate banks into two categories in each quarter: stand-alone banks, and 
banks in bank-holding companies (or BHCs).  I use the ID number of the highest holder 
for each bank in each quarter.  Those banks having a highest holder ID equal to zero in 
any particular quarter are considered stand-alone banks in that quarter (and thus 
StandAlone = 1); otherwise, banks are considered to be operating under a BHC (and 
StandAlone = 0).   
 In untabulated results,  I find an unexpected positive coefficient on 
StandAlone*DELR , using Ln(Uninsured_Deposits) as dependent variable.  The 
coefficient on the interaction term using Uninsured_Deposits% as dependent variable, is 
negative as expected but insignificant (–0.002; t-stat = 0.64) (Table 13).  Thus, relative to 
the bank holding status, standalone banks that delay more do not seem to be 




7.   CONCLUSION 
 This study provides evidence that uninsured deposit financing—a key and 
growing source of capital for banks over the past twenty years—are lower for banks 
exhibiting higher reporting opacity, consistent with uninsured depositors playing a 
monitoring role over banks’ risk-taking.  In particular, I find the both the level and 
percentage of uninsured deposits are negatively associated with my proxy for reporting 
opacity.  My proxy is DELR, introduced by Bushman and Williams (2015) in which a 
larger value is consistent with lower quality reporting due to more delays in recognizing 
expected losses.  These findings occur for a broad sample of US commercial banks 
during the period 1994-2013, and are robust to the inclusion of an extensive set of control 
variables and various research designs.  Cross-sectional analyses confirm that these 
effects are accentuated for banks lacking the too-big to fail designation (and thus not 
having implicit government guarantees), provide some evidence of this effect being 
accentuated for private banks (which lack the more robust reporting of publicly-traded 
banks), and reveal the effect to be more prominent during recessionary periods.  
Combined, these results are consistent with a monitoring role played by uninsured 
depositors over banks’ loan loss provisioning opacity.  This role appears consistent with 
both the incentives uninsured depositors face due to a lack of governmental guarantees 
insuring their deposits, and from such depositors—who are comprised of very wealthy 
individuals or institutions—likely having the resources to engage in such monitoring.  
One primary caveat to these inferences is that uninsured depositors’ direct actions are 
unobservable; thus, I infer them from banks’ aggregate uninsured deposits.  Nonetheless, 
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this study presents important new evidence consistent with accounting transparency, 
measured by timeliness of loan loss recognition, playing a role in uninsured deposit 
financing, consistent with prior research suggesting that transparency has a positive effect 










Uninsured deposit amounts of bank i in quarter t is calculated as follows for the 
identified quarters: 
(i) before 2006Q2 = ($ Deposit Accts > $100 K) − $100 K * (# Deposit Accts 
> $100 K);   
(ii) 2006Q2-2009Q2 = ($ Deposit Accts > $100 K) − $100 K * (# Deposit 
Accts > $100 K) + ($ Retirement Deposit Accts > $250 K) − $250 K * (# 
Retirement Deposit Accts > $250 K); 
(iii) 2009Q3 onward = ($ Deposit Accts > $250 K) − $250 K * (# Deposit 
Accts > $250 K) + ($ Retirement Deposit Accts > $250 K) − $250 K * (# 
Retirement Deposit Accts > $250 K). 
 
Ln(Uninsured_Deposits)it  
Natural log of uninsured deposits of bank i in quarter t. 
 
Uninsured_Depositsit%   
The ratio of uninsured deposits to total assets of bank i in quarter t. 
 
Uninsured/Total_Depositsit  
The ratio of uninsured deposits to total deposits of bank i in quarter t. 
 
Ln(ΔUninsured_Deposits)it   




Dependent variable alternatively equals Ln(Uninsured_Deposits)it or 




DELRit-1 (Flow Measure)  
An indicator variable equal to 1 if the lagged delay measure of bank i is negative 
during the quarter, and 0 otherwise, where the delay measure is the difference in 
adjusted-R2 (Equation (2) - Equation (1)) from the following two rolling 
regressions for each bank-quarter using the observations of the past 3 years.  I 





LLPit = β0 + β1 ΔNPLit-2 + β2 ΔNPLit-1 + β3 Tier1it-1 + β4 EBLLPit + β5 Sizeit-1 +  
β6 RealEstate%it + β7 CommIndust%it + εit       (1) 
LLPit = β0 + β1 ΔNPLit-2 + β2 ΔNPLit-1 + β3 Tier1it-1 + β4 EBLLPit + β5 Sizeit-1 +  




LLPit is loan loss provisions scaled by lagged total loans of bank i in quarter 
t. 
ΔNPL is change in nonperforming loans divided by lagged total loans.  
Tier1 is Tier 1 capital divided by risk-weighted assets. 
EBLLP is earnings before loan loss provision, scaled by lagged total loans. 
Size is the natural log of total assets.  
RealEstate% is the amount of loans secured by real estate, scaled by total 
loans.  
CommIndust% is the amount of commercial and industrial loans, scaled by 
total loans. 
 
DELR6it-1 (Flow Measure)  
Requiring 6 observations in Equations (1) and (2) above to construct the delay 
measure. 
 
DELR10it-1 (Flow Measure)  
Requiring 10 observations in Equations (1) and (2) above to construct the delay 
measure. 
 
DELR_Stock1it-1 (Stock Measure)  
An indicator variable equal to 1 if the lagged delay measure of bank i is below 
the median during the quarter, and 0 otherwise, where the delay measure is the 
ratio of loan loss allowance on balance sheet divided by nonperforming loans in 
current period (LLAit/NPLit). 
 
DELR_Stock2it-1 (Stock Measure)  
An indicator variable equal to 1 if the lagged delay measure of bank i is below 
the median during the quarter, and 0 otherwise, where the delay measure is the 
ratio of loan loss allowance on balance sheet divided by nonperforming loans in 






An indicator variable equal to 1 if the bank is not TBTF, and 0 otherwise.  For 
each quarter-year, banks above the upper 10th percentile of total assets are 
designated as TBTF banks; the remainder are designated as NonTBTF banks. 
 
Private  




An indicator variable equal to 1 if the bank is a stand-alone bank and not part of 





Nonperforming loans divided by total loans. 
 
ROA 
Annualized ROA, calculated as net income adjusted year-to-date reporting to 
within quarter, divided by beginning total assets. 
 
Liquidity% 
Liquid assets to assets, excludes MBS/ABS securities.  Liquid assets are cash, 




Implicit rate, calculated as interest expense on large time deposits (adjusted year-




Change in natural log of loans. 
 
Ln(StatePersonalInc) 
Natural log of real personal income by state where the bank is incorporated, 
adjusted for both inflation and using BEA’s regional price parities to better 




An indicator variable equal to 1 for periods between 2001Q2 and 2001Q4, and 







Table 1: Sample Selection and Distribution 
 





All Commercial Banks on the Bank Regulatory database, 
during 1994-2013, quarterly data 
15,538 713,228 
Less banks:    
not in 50 states and DC –39 –1,782 
with foreign ownership > 50% –792 –33,775 
with total assets growth > 50% or = -100% in a quarter –0 –46,262 
with total loans to assets < 5% (inactive in loan market) –240 –5,091 
smaller than $100 million in assets –5,153 –318,478 
with less than 8-quarter data to calculate DELR –314  –84,840 
with missing data for regressions –1,815 –73,670 
Final Sample 7,185 149,330 
 
 
Panel B:  Distribution of Observations by Total Assets  
Bank Group 
Average  












Small Banks  278.0 0.194 6,415 135,392 
Medium Banks 1,933.0 0.275 564 10,652 
Large Banks 10,664.6 0.317 206 3,286 
Final Sample 624.6 0.203 7,185 149,330 
    
Panel A presents for the sample selection.  Panel B presents the distribution by total 
assets, using three groupings: Small Banks include banks with assets from $100 million to 
$1 billion; Medium Banks include banks with assets from $1 billion to $5 billion; and 







Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A:  Pooled Sample 
Variables (N = 149,330) Mean St Dev p10 p25 Median p75 p90 
Ln(Uninsured_Deposit)it 10.622 1.207 9.315 9.830 10.446 11.209 12.140 
Uninsured_Deposit%it 0.165 0.089 0.065 0.101 0.150 0.213 0.286 
Assets ($ ‘000) 624,574 1,658,716 117,438 147,118 228,935 431,230 941,067 
Uninsured_Deposits ($ ‘000) 124,862 392,962 11,105 18,585 34,419 73,795 187,256 
TBTF 0.100 0.300 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Private 0.815 0.389 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
StandAlone 0.161 0.368 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
DiffR2 0.029 0.402 –0.392 –0.059 0.000 0.131 0.497 
DELRit-1  0.292 0.455 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Tier1it-1 0.144 0.062 0.095 0.105 0.126 0.161 0.214 
NPLit-1  0.013 0.020 0.001 0.003 0.007 0.016 0.031 
RealEstate%it-1 0.715 0.170 0.489 0.618 0.737 0.837 0.919 
EBLLPit-1 0.009 0.324 0.003 0.005 0.006 0.008 0.011 
ROAit-1  0.010 0.009 0.002 0.007 0.011 0.015 0.019 
Liquidity%it-1 0.266 0.133 0.115 0.169 0.245 0.341 0.449 
Sizeit-1   12.560 0.912 11.662 11.886 12.328 12.962 13.742 
LargeDepositRateit  0.038 0.014 0.019 0.026 0.037 0.049 0.057 
ΔLoanit 0.013 0.036 –0.029 –0.008 0.013 0.034 0.056 








Panel B:  Descriptive Statistics by DELR Partition 
 Less Delayed Banks 
DELR = 0  
(N = 105,755) 
 
More Delayed Banks 
DELR = 1  
(N = 43,575) 
 
 
Test of Mean 
Differences 
Variables Mean Median St Dev Mean Median St Dev  
Ln(Uninsured_Deposit)  10.673   10.477   1.263   10.500   10.377   1.046  –0.1732 *** 
Uninsured_Deposit%  0.167   0.152   0.092   0.160   0.147   0.082  –0.0072 *** 
Tier1it-1  0.143   0.124   0.063   0.147   0.130   0.058  0.0035 *** 
NPLit-1   0.013   0.007   0.021   0.013   0.007   0.018  –0.0006 *** 
RealEstate%it-1  0.712   0.734   0.175   0.724   0.743   0.156  0.0120 *** 
EBLLPit-1  0.010   0.006   0.385   0.007   0.006   0.005  –0.0035 * 
ROAit-1   0.010   0.011   0.010   0.010   0.011   0.009  0.0004 *** 
Liquidity%it-1  0.264   0.242   0.134   0.272   0.252   0.130   0.0075 ***  
Sizeit-1    12.602   12.346   0.962   12.459   12.288   0.765   –0.1436 ***  
LargeDepositRateit   0.038   0.038   0.014   0.037   0.036   0.014  –0.0014 *** 
ΔLoanit  0.013   0.013   0.036   0.012   0.012   0.033  –0.0014 *** 
Ln(StatePersonalInc)it  12.308   12.302   0.913   12.299   12.296   0.871  –0.0087 * 
     
This table presents descriptive statistics.  Panel A presents those for the full sample, and Panel B for the sample partitioned into 
two groups: those with DELR = 0 and those with DELR = 1.  DELR is an indicator variable equal to 1 if DiffR2 is negative 
(indicating low timeliness), and 0 otherwise.   The last column is a standard t-test comparing mean differences across the 
DELR = 1 and DELR = 0 bank groupings.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  







Table 3: Correlations 
 
Variables (N = 149,330)  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Ln(Uninsured_Deposit)it (1) 1            
Uninsured_Deposit%it (2) 0.637 1           
DELRit-1 (3) –0.065 –0.037 1          
Tier1it-1 (4) –0.257 –0.192 0.026 1         
NPLit-1  (5) –0.046 –0.106 –0.014 –0.056 1        
RealEstate%it-1 (6) –0.060 –0.126 0.032 0.062 0.079 1       
EBLLPit-1 (7) 0.003 0.014 –0.005 0.051 –0.006 –0.011 1      
ROAit-1  (8) 0.045 0.124 0.021 0.132 –0.486 –0.173 0.022 1     
Liquidity%it-1 (9) –0.089 0.034 0.026 0.536 –0.120 –0.102 0.026 0.136 1    
Sizeit-1 (10) 0.866 0.223 –0.072 –0.193 0.034 0.034 –0.001 –0.047 –0.149 1   
LargeDepositRateit  (11) –0.094 –0.063 –0.045 0.003 –0.201 –0.095 0.006 0.155 –0.033 –0.090 1  
ΔLoanit (12) 0.043 0.108 –0.018 –0.018 –0.303 –0.020 0.004 0.222 0.051 –0.029 0.158 1 
Ln(StatePersonalInc)it (13) 0.104 0.105 –0.004 –0.002 0.059 0.202 –0.011 –0.121 0.026 0.094 –0.098 –0.005 
    
This table presents Pearson correlations.  Bolded values indicate correlations significant at the 5% level.  N = 149,330 bank-













Variables Coeff  (t-stat) Coeff  (t-stat) Coeff  (t-stat) Coeff  (t-stat) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
DELRit-1 – –0.173 (25.27) *** –0.037 (6.43) *** –0.007 (14.22)*** –0.008 (9.09) *** 
Tier1it-1 + / –   –2.389 (15.19) ***   –0.286 (16.58) *** 
NPLit-1  –   –0.136 (0.50)   0.054 (1.55) 
RealEstate%it-1 –   –0.600 (13.29) ***   –0.073 (11.71) *** 
EBLLPit-1 +   0.021 (1.77) *   0.005 (2.16) ** 
ROAit-1  +   7.934 (14.56) ***   1.023 (12.56) *** 
Liquidity%it-1  +   0.533 (9.07) ***   0.062 (7.09) *** 
Sizeit-1 +   1.115 (153.47) ***   0.017 (15.15) *** 
LargeDepositRateit  + / –   –7.454 (11.17) ***   –1.135 (11.42) *** 
ΔLoanit +   1.242 (17.00) ***   0.163 (15.79) *** 
Ln(StatePersonalInc)it +   0.044 (5.69) ***   0.010 (7.97) *** 
          
Fixed Effects   Year-quarter  Year-quarter 
N  149,330 149,330 149,330 149,330 
Adj. R2  0.004 0.814 0.001 0.259 
    
This table presents results from analyses examining the association between uninsured deposits and opacity.  The sample 
includes 149,330 quarterly observations representing 7,185 individual banks.  In Columns (1) and (2) the dependent variable is 
Ln(Uninsured_Deposits)it, the natural log of uninsured deposits of bank i in quarter t.  In Columns (3) and (4) the dependent 
variable is Uninsured_Depositsit%, the ratio of uninsured deposits to total assets of bank i in quarter t.  Across all columns, the 
experimental variable is DELRit-1, a proxy for bank financial reporting opacity.  t-statistics are in parentheses.  ***, **, and * 
represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels for the indicated one- or two-tailed tests of significance.  Standard errors 













Coeff (t–stat) Coeff (t–stat) Coeff (t–stat) Coeff (t–stat) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
NonTBTFit–1 ? 0.042 (1.46)   0.007 (1.64)   
NonPublici ?   –0.031 (1.68) 
*   –0.004 (1.25) 
DELRit–1 ? 0.005 (0.23) –0.050 (3.62) 
*** 0.011 (3.01) *** –0.003 (1.19) 
NonTBTFit–1* DELRit–1 – –0.045 (2.12) **   –0.021 (5.42) ***   
Privatei* DELRit–1 –   0.017 (1.12)   –0.006 (2.27) ** 
Tier1it–1 + / – –2.384 (15.14) 
*** –2.373 (15.14) *** –0.285 (16.53) *** –0.283 (16.38) *** 
NPLit–1  – –0.135 (0.49) –0.125 (0.46) 0.054 (1.57) 0.055 (1.59) 
RealEstate%it–1 – –0.606 (13.39) 
*** –0.599 (13.29) *** –0.074 (11.82) *** –0.073 (11.75) *** 
EBLLPit–1 + 0.021 (1.76) 
* 0.021 (1.77) * 0.005 (2.14) ** 0.005 (2.15) ** 
ROAit–1 + 7.922 (14.52) 
*** 7.945 (14.56) *** 1.022 (12.55) *** 1.025 (12.55) *** 
Liquidity%it–1  + 0.532 (9.05) 
*** 0.536 (9.09) *** 0.061 (7.04) *** 0.062 (7.14) *** 
Sizeit–1 + 1.124 (112.99) 
*** 1.110 (138.34) *** 0.018 (11.91) *** 0.016 (13.21) *** 
LargeDepositRateit  + / – –7.467 (11.20) 
*** –7.409 (11.12) *** –1.134 (11.42) *** –1.126 (11.36) *** 
ΔLoanit + 1.241 (16.99) 
*** 1.248 (17.10) *** 0.163 (15.77) *** 0.164 (15.85) *** 
Ln(StatePersonalInc)it + 0.044 (5.71) 
*** 0.043 (5.59) *** 0.010 (7.98) *** 0.009 (7.84) *** 
       
Fixed Effect  Year–quarter Year–quarter Year–quarter Year–quarter 
N  149,330 149,330 149,330 149,330 
Adj. R2  0.814 0.814 0.260 0.259 
    
This table presents results examining variation in uninsured deposits and bank opacity conditional on two cross-sectional bank 
characteristics.  In Columns (1) and (3), it is NonTBTF (an indicator variable equal to 1 if the bank is not designated as too-big 






and zero otherwise).  In Columns (1)–(2), the dependent variable is Ln(Uninsured_Deposits)it, the natural log of uninsured 
deposits of bank i in quarter t.  In Columns (3)–(4), the dependent variable is Uninsured_Depositsit%, the ratio of uninsured 
deposits to total assets of bank i in quarter t.  Across all columns, the experimental variable is DELRit-1, a proxy for bank 
financial reporting opacity.  t-statistics are in parentheses.  ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 












Coeff  (t-stat) Coeff  (t-stat) 
  (1) (2) 
DELR_Stock1it-1 – –0.024 (2.81) *** –0.004 (3.34) *** 
Tier1it-1 + / – –3.162 (18.68) 
*** –0.374 (20.29) *** 
NPLit-1  – –0.180 (0.47) 0.033 (0.64) 
RealEstate%it-1 – –0.556 (12.24) 
*** –0.063 (10.09) *** 
EBLLPit-1 + 14.486 (6.14) 
*** 2.659 (7.96) *** 
ROAit-1  + 3.011 (4.32) 
*** 0.104 (1.03) 
Liquidity%it-1  + 0.570 (8.89) 
*** 0.055 (6.13) *** 
Sizeit-1 + 1.092 (142.75) 
*** 0.012 (11.39) *** 
LargeDepositRateit  + / – –6.908 (11.20) 
*** –1.068 (11.40) *** 
ΔLoanit + 1.436 (19.09) 
*** 0.184 (17.83) *** 
Ln(StatePersonalInc)it + 0.057 (7.68) 
*** 0.012 (10.37) *** 
      
Fixed Effect  Year-quarter Year-quarter 
N  191,335 191,399 
Adj. R2  0.807 0.254 
    
This table presents results from sensitivity analyses using an alternative DELR stock 
measure to examine uninsured deposits and bank opacity.  In Column (1) the dependent 
variable is Ln(Uninsured_Deposits)it, the natural log of uninsured deposits of bank i in 
quarter t.  In Column (2) the dependent variable is Uninsured_Depositsit%, the ratio of 
uninsured deposits to total assets of bank i in quarter t.  Across both columns, the 
experimental variable is DELR_Stock1, an indicator variable equal to 1 if lagged 
LLAit/NPLit is smaller than the median during the quarter, and 0 otherwise.  t-statistics are 
in parentheses.  ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels for 
the indicated one- or two-tailed tests of significance.  Standard errors are clustered by 





Table 7: Sensitivity Analyses ̶ Alternative Time-series Related DELR Measures and Uninsured Deposit Financing 
 
  Ln(Uninsured_Deposits)it Uninsured_Deposits%it 
Variables Predicted 
Sign 
Using 6  
Quarters 
Using 10  
Quarters 
Using 6  
Quarters 
Using 10  
Quarters 
  Coeff (t-stat) Coeff (t-stat) Coeff (t-stat) Coeff (t-stat) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
DELRit-1 – –0.039 (6.77) *** –0.013 (2.32) ** –0.009 (9.96) *** –0.004 (5.17) *** 
Tier1it-1 + / – –2.896 (17.39) 
*** –2.784 (15.62) *** –0.355 (18.94) *** –0.337 (16.96) *** 
NPLit-1  – –0.314 (0.91) –0.098 (0.25) –0.007 (0.15) 0.020 (0.39) 
RealEstate%it-1 – –0.570 (12.74) 
*** –0.564 (11.59) *** –0.064 (10.13) *** –0.068 (9.97) *** 
EBLLPit-1 + 18.384 (7.89) 
*** 18.490 (7.20) *** 2.923 (8.74) *** 2.865 (7.97) *** 
ROAit-1  + 3.027 (4.37) 
*** 3.697 (4.48) *** 0.206 (2.00) ** 0.262 (2.24) ** 
Liquidity%it-1  + 0.455 (7.47) 
*** 0.459 (6.86) *** 0.048 (5.45) *** 0.047 (4.95) *** 
Sizeit-1 + 1.104 (153.02) 
*** 1.106 (147.15) *** 0.014 (12.70) *** 0.017 (13.67) *** 
LargeDepositRateit  + / – –7.185 (11.20) 
*** –6.999 (9.39) *** –1.091 (11.39) *** –1.035 (9.65) *** 
ΔLoanit + 1.256 (17.59) 
*** 1.326 (15.58) *** 0.162 (15.88) *** 0.169 (14.37) *** 
Ln(StatePersonalInc)it + 0.046 (6.12) 
*** 0.039 (4.71) *** 0.010 (8.64) *** 0.009 (7.07) *** 
          
Fixed Effect  Year-quarter Year-quarter Year-quarter Year-quarter 
N  162,663 113,555 162,703 113,584 
Adj. R2  0.815 0.802 0.264 0.269 
    
This table presents results from sensitivity analyses to using alternative time-series to define DELR to examine uninsured 
depositors and bank opacity.  In Columns (1) and (2) the dependent variable is Ln(Uninsured_Deposits)it, the natural log of 
uninsured deposits of bank i in quarter t.  In Columns (3) and (4) the dependent variable is Uninsured_Depositsit%, the ratio of 
uninsured deposits to total assets of bank i in quarter t.  The experimental variable is DELR, a proxy for bank financial 
reporting opacity.  DELR is alternatively defined requiring 6 quarters in Columns (1) and (3), and 10 quarters in Columns (2) 
and (4).  t-statistics are in parentheses.  ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels for the indicated 










Variables Coeff  (t-stat) Coeff  (t-stat) Coeff  (t-stat) Coeff  (t-stat) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
DELRit-1 – –0.006 (5.47) *** –0.011 (9.96) *** –0.030 (2.82) *** –0.044 (4.15) *** 
Tier1it-1 + / – –0.411 (16.36) 
*** –0.329 (13.18) *** –2.826 (13.39) *** –2.688 (12.46) *** 
NPLit-1  – –0.385 (6.72) 
*** 0.001 (0.01) –1.117 (2.24) ** –0.237 (0.45) 
RealEstate%it-1 – –0.072 (9.12) 
*** –0.090 (11.13) *** –0.566 (11.17) *** –0.595 (11.39) *** 
EBLLPit-1 + 1.571 (3.83) 
*** 4.128 (9.20) *** 13.318 (4.58) *** 17.934 (5.78) *** 
ROAit-1 + 0.911 (7.15) 
*** 0.115 (0.85) 3.818 (3.58) *** 3.116 (2.79) *** 
Liquidity%it-1  + 0.098 (9.41) 
*** 0.024 (2.15) ** 0.057 (0.84) –0.033 (0.44) 
Sizeit-1 + 0.033 (21.16) 
*** 0.029 (19.25) *** 0.929 (106.18) *** 0.924 (104.75) *** 
LargeDepositRateit  + / – –0.619 (13.51) 
*** –1.291 (10.68) *** –4.631 (12.10) *** –6.640 (7.49) *** 
ΔLoanit + 0.231 (17.08) 
*** 0.209 (15.93) *** 2.056 (13.76) *** 2.310 (15.35) *** 
Ln(StatePersonalInc)it + 0.012 (7.99) 
*** 0.010 (6.63) *** 0.040 (4.79) *** 0.034 (4.02) *** 
          
Fixed Effects  No Year-quarter No Year-quarter 
N  149,361 149,361 83,151 83,151 
Adj. R2  0.178 0.295 0.324 0.332 
    
This table presents results from sensitivity analyses using alternative dependent variables to examine uninsured deposits and 
bank opacity.  In Columns (1) and (2), the dependent variable is Uninsured/Total_Depositsit, the ratio of uninsured deposits to 
total deposits of bank i in quarter t.  In Columns (3) and (4), the dependent variable is Ln(ΔUninsured_Deposits)it, the natural 
log of change in uninsured deposits of bank i in quarter t.  The experimental variable is DELRit-1, a proxy for bank financial 
reporting opacity.  t-statistics are in parentheses.  ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels for the 




Table 9: Additional Analyses ̶ Uninsured Deposit Financing During Recession 
versus Non-Recession Periods 
 











Coeff  (t-stat) Coeff  (t-stat) 
  (1) (2) 
DELRit-1 – –0.042 (4.86) *** –0.029 (4.65) *** 
Tier1it-1 + / – –2.715 (14.43) 
*** –2.860 (16.63) *** 
NPLit-1  – 1.334 (3.26) 
*** –0.618 (1.63) 
RealEstate%it-1 – –0.475 (8.59) 
*** –0.577 (12.72) *** 
EBLLPit-1 + 19.697 (6.24) 
*** 18.708 (7.79) *** 
ROAit-1  + 0.832 (0.93) 3.890 (5.06) 
*** 
Liquidity%it-1  + 0.351 (4.43) 
*** 0.465 (7.35) *** 
Sizeit-1 + 1.073 (117.45) 
*** 1.110 (149.93) *** 
LargeDepositRateit + / – –7.446 (8.78) 
*** –7.239 (10.58) *** 
ΔLoanit + 1.170 (9.01) 
*** 1.273 (16.33) *** 
Ln(StatePersonalInc)it + 0.052 (6.13) 
*** 0.041 (5.27) *** 
      
Fixed Effect  Year-quarter Year-quarter 
N  26,744 122,586 
Adj. R2  0.823 0.809 
    
This table presents results from additional analyses examining uninsured deposits and 
bank opacity during recession and non-recession periods.  Columns (1) and (2) present 
results using recession, and non-recession subsamples, respectively.  Recession periods 
between 2001Q2– 2001Q4 and 2008Q1–2009Q2 (i.e., those quarters defined by NBER 
as recessionary quarters).  In all Columns, the dependent variable is 
Ln(Uninsured_Deposits)it, the natural log of uninsured deposits of bank i in quarter t.  
The experimental variable is DELRit-1, a proxy for bank financial reporting opacity.  t-
statistics are in parentheses.  ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels for the indicated one- or two-tailed tests of significance.  Standard errors are 






Table 10: Additional Analyses ̶ Uninsured Deposit Financing across Bank Size Quartiles 
 







Quartile 1  
(smallest banks) 
Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4  
(largest banks) 
Coeff  (t-stat) Coeff  (t-stat) Coeff  (t-stat) Coeff  (t-stat) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
DELRit-1 – –0.074 (6.67) *** –0.027 (2.70) *** –0.033 (3.19) *** –0.002 (0.15) 
Tier1it-1 + / – –2.129 (9.00) 
*** –2.206 (8.17) *** –3.569 (11.11) *** –3.882 (10.53) *** 
NPLit-1  – –0.056 (0.09) –0.414 (0.70) –0.569 (0.90) –0.048 (0.06) 
RealEstate%it-1 – –0.294 (3.69) 
*** –0.449 (6.35) *** –0.598 (7.29) *** –0.842 (8.80) *** 
EBLLPit-1 + 22.440 (4.56) 
*** 16.711 (4.11) *** 20.939 (5.08) *** 14.423 (3.15) *** 
ROAit-1  + 0.644 (0.43) 3.206 (2.72) 
*** 4.429 (3.61) *** 4.473 (2.87) *** 
Liquidity%it-1  + 0.553 (5.53) 
*** 0.485 (4.61) *** 0.329 (3.21) *** 0.425 (3.07) *** 
Sizeit-1 + 1.139 (16.68) 
*** 1.019 (17.09) *** 1.020 (21.98) *** 1.076 (66.99) *** 
LargeDepositRateit  + / – –7.942 (7.43) 
*** –6.473 (5.95) *** –6.135 (5.07) *** –7.256 (4.75) *** 
ΔLoanit + 0.978 (8.92) 
*** 1.148 (9.42) *** 1.289 (9.94) *** 1.654 (8.21) *** 
Ln(StatePersonalInc)it + 0.022 (1.72) 
* 0.036 (2.94) *** 0.038 (2.96) *** 0.065 (4.35) *** 
          
Fixed Effect  Year-quarter Year-quarter Year-quarter Year-quarter 
N  35,857 38,195 38,480 36,793 
Adj. R2  0.279 0.320 0.405 0.789 
    
This table presents results from additional analyses examining the uninsured deposits and bank opacity across different bank 
size quartiles.  In all columns, the dependent variable is Ln(Uninsured_Deposits)it, the natural log of uninsured deposits of 
bank i in quarter t, and the experimental variable is DELRit-1, a proxy for bank financial reporting opacity.  t-statistics are in 
parentheses.  ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels for the indicated one- or two-tailed tests of 












Coeff  (t-stat) Coeff  (t-stat) 
  (1) (2) 
DELR_Stock2it-1 – –0.017 (2.15) ** –0.002 (1.96) * 
Tier1it-1 + / – –3.165 (18.69) 
*** –0.375 (20.32) *** 
NPLit-1  – –0.375 (1.07) –0.010 (0.22) 
RealEstate%it-1 – –0.556 (12.24) 
*** –0.063 (10.09) *** 
EBLLPit-1 + 14.645 (6.20) 
*** 2.693 (8.07) *** 
ROAit-1  + 2.927 (4.20) 
*** 0.087 (0.87) 
Liquidity%it-1  + 0.570 (8.88) 
*** 0.055 (6.13) *** 
Sizeit-1 + 1.092 (142.55) 
*** 0.012 (11.38) *** 
LargeDepositRateit  + / – –6.899 (11.18) 
*** –1.067 (11.38) *** 
ΔLoanit + 1.436 (19.09) 
*** 0.184 (17.82) *** 
Ln(StatePersonalInc)it + 0.057 (7.67) 
*** 0.012 (10.36) *** 
      
Fixed Effect  Year-quarter Year-quarter 
N  191,335 191,399 
Adj. R2  0.807 0.254 
    
This table presents results from sensitivity analyses using an alternative DELR stock 
measure to examine uninsured deposits and bank opacity.  In Column (1) the dependent 
variable is Ln(Uninsured_Deposits)it, the natural log of uninsured deposits of bank i in 
quarter t.  In Column (2) the dependent variable is Uninsured_Depositsit%, the ratio of 
uninsured deposits to total assets of bank i in quarter t.  Across both columns, the 
experimental variable is DELR_Stock2, an indicator variable equal to 1 if lagged 
LLAit/NPLit+1 is smaller than the median during the quarter, and 0 otherwise.  t-statistics 
are in parentheses.  ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
for the indicated one- or two-tailed tests of significance.  Standard errors are clustered by 











Coeff  (t-stat) Coeff  (t-stat) 
  (1) (2) 
DELRit-1 – –0.032 (6.39) *** –0.008 (13.35) *** 
Tier1it-1 + / – –1.661 (14.67) 
*** –0.162 (14.37) *** 
NPLit-1  – –0.033 (0.15) 0.008 (0.37) 
RealEstate%it-1 – –0.323 (9.47) 
*** –0.044 (11.71) *** 
EBLLPit-1 + –0.017 (4.08) 
*** –0.001 (1.62) 
ROAit-1  + 7.063 (16.28) 
*** 0.664 (12.82) *** 
Liquidity%it-1  + 0.546 (11.63) 
*** 0.055 (10.23) *** 
Sizeit-1 + 1.210 (214.72) 
*** 0.027 (40.87) *** 
LargeDepositRateit  + / – –4.820 (10.72) 
*** –0.666 (12.69) *** 
ΔLoanit + 0.874 (19.95) 
*** 0.089 (17.89) *** 
Ln(StatePersonalInc)it + 0.027 (4.23) 
*** 0.006 (7.69) *** 
      
Fixed Effect  Year-quarter Year-quarter 
N  296,727 296,727 
Adj. R2  0.860 0.299 
    
This table presents results from analyses examining the association between uninsured 
deposits and opacity.  The sample includes all banks, including those with total assets of 
less than $100 million, i.e. 296,727 quarterly observations representing 11,933 individual 
banks.  In Columns (1) the dependent variable is Ln(Uninsured_Deposits)it, the natural 
log of uninsured deposits of bank i in quarter t.  In Columns (2) the dependent variable is 
Uninsured_Depositsit%, the ratio of uninsured deposits to total assets of bank i in quarter 
t.  Across all columns, the experimental variable is DELRit-1, a proxy for bank financial 
reporting opacity.  t-statistics are in parentheses.  ***, **, and * represent significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels for the indicated one- or two-tailed tests of significance.  











Coeff  (t-stat) Coeff  (t-stat) 
  (1) (2) 
StandAlonei ? –0.151 (6.93) 
*** –0.011 (3.60) *** 
DELRit-1 ? –0.044 (7.81) 
*** –0.008 (8.61) *** 
StandAlonei*DELRit-1 – 0.036 (1.85) * –0.002 (0.64) 
Tier1it-1 + / – –2.123 (13.63) 
*** –0.265 (15.05) *** 
NPLit-1  – –0.227 (0.83) 0.046 (1.34) 
RealEstate%it-1 – –0.545 (12.19) 
*** –0.069 (10.77) *** 
EBLLPit-1 + 0.022 (1.91) 
* 0.005 (2.21) ** 
ROAit-1  + 7.296 (13.70) 
*** 0.973 (12.14) *** 
Liquidity%it-1  + 0.498 (8.66) 
*** 0.059 (6.78) *** 
Sizeit-1 + 1.115 (154.18) 
*** 0.017 (15.16) *** 
LargeDepositRateit  + / – –7.403 (11.20) 
*** –1.131 (11.41) *** 
ΔLoanit + 1.281 (17.58) 
*** 0.166 (16.08) *** 
Ln(StatePersonalInc)it + 0.049 (6.42) 
*** 0.010 (8.34) *** 
      
Fixed Effect  Year-quarter Year-quarter 
N  149,330 149,330 
Adj. R2  0.816 0.261 
    
This table presents results examining variation in uninsured deposits and bank opacity 
conditional on one cross-sectional bank characteristic, i.e. StandAlone (an indicator 
variable equal to 1 if the bank is not a bank holding company BHC, and 0 otherwise).  In 
Column (1), the dependent variable is Ln(Uninsured_Deposits)it, the natural log of 
uninsured deposits of bank i in quarter t.  In Column (2), the dependent variable is 
Uninsured_Depositsit%, the ratio of uninsured deposits to total assets of bank i in quarter 
t.  Across all columns, the experimental variable is DELRit-1, a proxy for bank financial 
reporting opacity.  t-statistics are in parentheses.  ***, **, and * represent significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels for the indicated one- or two-tailed tests of significance.  
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